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We focus on three categories of related transaction which listed companies often 
happen.The three categories of related transaction: product marketing, services offer 
or accept  , guarantee and mortgages . The interlocked directors organize resource 
through the chain ,and participate in the company management .The important 
features of the corporate governance --the competition of the controlling power , how 
to influence the size of the related transactions? Whether interlocking directorship 
appeared in the board of directors of the company relate to company government. 
According to A-share listed companies in the cities of Shanghai and Shenzhen of 2009 
annual reports publish the business executive’s material and related transaction, found 
that interlocked directors promote the related transactions .In addition, interlocked 
directors will be divided into leading to positive controlling power change and 
negative controlling power change. The results of the study shows that the interlocked 
directors leading to positive controlling power change will promote the controlling 
shareholder group of related transactions ;the interlocked directors leading to negative 
controlling power change, will restrain the controlling shareholders group of related 
transactions . "Voting challenge system” can’t effectively prevent the controlling 
shareholders using group of related transactions to empty the company. 
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本，原始数据来源于深交所和上交所网站上公布的 1082 家上市公司 2008 年和
2009 年两年的年度报告。研究数据来源有两种：（1）各上市公司年报中的三个
部分手工收集连锁董事数据：公司基本情况简介；董事、监事、高级管理人员和
员工情况；重要事项。（2）其他数据来源于 CSMAR 系列研究数据库 2008 和 2009
































































































Degree papers are in the “Xiamen University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Database”. Full
texts are available in the following ways: 
1. If your library is a CALIS member libraries, please log on http://etd.calis.edu.cn/ and submit
requests online, or consult the interlibrary loan department in your library. 
2. For users of non-CALIS member libraries, please mail to etd@xmu.edu.cn for delivery details.
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
